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The phrase "high containment laboratory" might, for some, conjure up images of Hollywood thrillers, but there are real people behind biological research who, every day, despite a very deliberate and methodical approach, put themselves in harm's way for the sake of research, homeland security, and the health and welfare of the nation. Much of their operational protocol falls back to strict standard operating procedures, but the leaping-off point for their presumption of safety is strict reliance upon the facility. A number of codes and guidelines exist, but no central standard for facility design.
"High containment" can be defined as, "the physical containment of highly pathogenic organisms or agents." The National Institutes of Health (NIH) takes the lead in defining Bio-Safety Classes 1-4 (BSL1-BSL4) for facilities to clearly convey the end use of a lab research space and its ultimate lab practices, techniques, appropriate equipment, and facility operations.
The BSL classes are conceived particularly with respect to the types of ongoing work and the health risk level of the agents being handled by researchers within these facilities. Generally, BSL3 facilities are fashioned for the handling of toxic and lethal agents that have some known remedy or treatment. (BSL4 facilities are those that work with pathogens for which a cure is unknown.)
The question is, how many of these BSL3 facilities actually meet the current codes, design standards, and engineering best practices for high containment facility design?
In 2007, the U.S. General Accounting Office called for the creation of a centralized federal standard meant to define at least the minimum facility criteria for an operational BSL3. This central standard has partly been the subject of conversation at NIH with the creation of a Blue Ribbon Panel on Bioterrorism in the wake of the 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States.
Since then, NIH has been working together with the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID) and has defined a blueprint for biological counter-terrorism including elements of facility infrastructure, basic research, and countermeasures. While this effort is ongoing, it is more than fair to say that the state-of-the-art facility design guidelines are less than conformed. With no central standard in place, the task of keeping abreast of changes in requirements has become a complicated exercise.
A review of primary and current codes and design guidelines for BSL3s reveals areas in which some existing facilities may be severely out of compliance.
WHO's focus with regard to laboratory design and facilities requires:
Safety Questions Arise in High-Risk Labs
Federal Publication Is a Primary Reference for Bio-Safety Standards